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There is no denying the fact that the multiple processes of ‗globalisation‘, which are taking place 
these days on a large scale, have caused significant transformations in almost all life aspects of 
millions around the world. There are now more interactions and exchanges not only within the 
same cultures but also among different cultures due to the increase in information flows across 
the globe, migratory movements, demographic changes and transformations in social structures 
and institutions.  
 
The increased intercultural and cross-cultural communication has clearly enhanced intercultural 
exchange and learning. However, these growing intercultural encounters have also given rise to 
rhetorical and actual confrontation and defensiveness amid many groups that feel threatened by 
the external developments associated with the sweeping processes of globalisation. This situation 
highlights the importance of cross-cultural dialogue as a means to constructive communication 
among individuals and communities.  
 
It is in this broad context that we intend to discuss the vital issue of universal protection of 
human rights. The proclamation of a set of universal human rights recognising the inherent 
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family was a significant 
milestone in the pursuit of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
 
However, after sixty years of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
promulgation of a growing number of international conventions and treaties as well as domestic 
legislations, human rights are still violated on a global scale. A quick examination of recent 
reports released by human rights organisations, national and civil society groups and watchdogs 
show a dramatic surge in human rights violations in many countries around the world.  
 
The persistence of violence against women, children and other vulnerable social groups, the 
consequences of the ‗war on terror‘ on fundamental human rights and liberties, the high priority 
accorded to the state security vis-à-vis the security and rights of individuals and the punitive 
responses to ‗unlawful‘ migration are just a few of the many challenges to the universal 
application and protection of human rights.  
 
It may be argued that many cases of human rights violations, notwithstanding the failure of states 
to honour their international commitments, are due to the inadequacy of the measures or political 
tools designed to ensure the respect for and protection of human rights. This insufficiency of 
implementation and enforcement measures, the argument goes, entails the rethinking of the 
whole instruments and policies adopted so far for the promotion and protection of human rights 
globally.  
 





Although we admit that there is always a need for critical rethinking of the measures in place to 
ensure efficiency, we argue that the debate should not focus only on the tools but also on the 
strategies and more precisely on how relevant issues are debated and how decisions are made. It 
is in this context that we argue that cross-cultural dialogue
1
 could be the medium not only for 
engaging in that reflective process but also for reaching consensuses that are indispensable for 
the universal protection of human rights. The paper will not be exhaustive but should be taken as 
an indicative document intended to help start debate on the topic of discussion in this paper. 
 
The universality of human rights: the debate continues… 
The universality of human rights has been clearly established and recognised in numerous 
international legislations. This global consensus is formally embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that was adopted and proclaimed by the General 
Assembly on 10 December 1948 (UN, 2009). Based on the idea that a common understanding of 
human rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for their full realisation, the UDHR was 
the first global proclamation that recognised the universality of human rights as birthrights 
inherent to all human beings and as a concern of the entire international community. That is why 
it is considered the foundation of international human rights law and a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations.  
 
The spirit of the UDHR was reaffirmed in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action that 
was adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 (UNHCHR, 2009). In 
article 1, the Declaration affirms that ―the universal nature of these rights [human rights] and 
freedoms is beyond question‖. The universality of human rights is asserted as the basis for the 
obligation incumbent upon states to promote and protect those rights. The Declaration also 
affirms, in article 5, that ―all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated‖, and that ―it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms‖.  
 
Despite the broad consensus on the universality of human rights and the need for their universal 
protection, the debate on the justification and application of these rights continues unabated. As 
Meckled-García and Çali (2006:13) argue, ―there is no single consensus on the justification of 
human rights‖. In view of the multidisciplinary and heterogeneous approaches to human rights, 
the authors maintain that the ―normative human rights theory and human rights law (IHRL) [do 
not] represent homogeneous, univocal, doctrines‖.  
 
The debate is compounded by the views of those who subscribe to some version of cultural 
relativism. Cultural relativism, in brief, is the assertion that human values, far from being 
universal, are context-specific and hence their interpretation, promotion and application are 
subject solely to the cultural norms and particularities of the society concerned (Pollis and 
Schwab 2000).  
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 It is important to underline, at this early stage, that we employ the term ‗cross-cultural‘ in a way that is indicative 
of the permeability and malleability of what is commonly perceived as clearly delineated cultural borders. 
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discourses that see cultures as ‗self-contained‘ and  uncontaminated‘ units, and those ‗intercultural‘ discourses that 
simply put more emphasis on the dynamic of cultural interaction whilst adhering to the same multicultural, 
essentialist understanding of culture. 






Donnelly (2003) provides sufficient arguments against cultural relativism in terms of human 
rights, but he recognises the role of culture in the interpretation of universally held human rights. 
He suggests that particular human rights are like ‗essentially contested concepts‘ in which there 
is a rather general consensus on basic meaning coupled with no less important, systematic, and 
apparently irresolvable conflicts of interpretations. In such circumstances, he admits, ―culture 
provides one plausible and defensible mechanism for selecting interpretations (and forms)‖ 
(Donnelly, 2003:96).  
 
Even the relative consensus outlined by Donnelly has been oftentimes questioned by those that 
are wary of the Western hegemonic position in the world. Dascal (1991:1) suggests that ―after 
some five centuries of expansion, European—or Western—civilization has succeeded in 
establishing its cultural, political, and economic hegemony over the planet‖. This hegemonic 
position has enabled the West, it is argued, to determine not only global structures of power and 
wealth but also the terms of the normative structure of global society. Some African scholars, for 
instance, have maintained that the allegedly Western-based conceptualisation of human rights 
does not take into account the cultural, socioeconomic, and political realities of the other parts of 
the world (Ahmad and Deng, 1990). In particular, critics from countries that were under colonial 
domination in 1948 argue that the provisions of the UDHR reflect the view of the dominant 
powers of the time.  
 
Others claim that the discourse of human rights is often used as a political instrument to justify 
intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. The new doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention (Holzgrefe, 2003:18) in the name of human rights has been under attack by those 
critics who assert that many interventions conduced under this rubric were made only to serve 
pure political agendas.
2
 To account for the disappointing records of human rights in ‗developing‘ 
countries, some have also argued that ―most developing countries are poor and cannot afford the 
full implementation of human rights‖ (Burnell and Randall, 2008:362). Although full realisation 
of human rights depends on the existence of appropriate socio-economic conditions, this 
argument is frequently used as an excuse by authoritarian regimes and their apologists to 
perpetuate their undemocratic rules.  
 
For his part, Sen (2004:316) has argued that the proponents of universality of human rights 
mistakenly insist on the primacy of specific classes of rights (particularly civil and political 
rights) over supposedly economic, cultural and social rights. This distinction unnecessarily 
excludes significant conceptions of human rights from the purview of desirable and enforceable 
human rights.  
 
 
The universality of human rights in a culturally diverse world 
 
In view of the discussion above, it is clear that the debate regarding the universality of human 
rights and consequently their universal protection is far from over. Against this backdrop, a 
significant question that can be posed is how the universality and the universal promotion and 
                                                 
2
 From instance, criticisms of the human rights argument as a justification for the war in Iraq abound not only in the 
Middle East but also in the West and other regions.   





protection of human rights can be reconciled with the cultural diversity characterising our world 
these days. In other words, how the universality of human rights and its implications for 
promoting and protecting these rights globally can be maintained in the context of the cultural 
diversity and plurality of the contemporary world? Is it possible to arrive at a cross-cultural 
minimal understanding on human rights and the need for promoting and protecting them 
globally? These are significant questions that we will touch on in the following discussion.  
 
There are obviously enough philosophical, ethical and legal arguments for the universality of 
human rights, and there is a board international consensus on them, which has provided the basis 
for their acceptance, promotion and protection globally. However, the main challenge, in our 
view, is how to engage those who, for various reasons, question or oppose the existing 
international norms of human rights because they perceive them as exclusive, ethnocentric or 
incompatible with all or some elements of their own value systems. As the previous discussion 
shows, there is still a great deal to be done to meet this pressing challenge.   
 
To demonstrate some aspects of the ongoing debate on human rights and the associated issue of 
universal protection of these rights, we will discuss, in brief, how that debate is played out in the 
context of the Islam-West relation.
3
 Once again, we have to admit that the subject is so complex 
and hence our discussion will be more indicative than exhaustive.  
 
We often hear some commentators, especially outside the Islamic World, saying that the 
fundamental obstacle to any positive interaction between Islam and the West and their agreement 
on a set of common values consists in the fact that the Islamic values are at odds with Western 
ideals and values. In particular, it is argued that the value system defended by the West and the 
one promoted by Islam cannot be reconciled. Others argue that the restoration of religion to the 
sphere of the personal and its ‗depoliticisation‘, that is to say its removal from the public sphere, 
is the main challenge that Muslim societies have to grapple with in order to effectively join the 
‗modern‘ world.
4
 In sum, because Islam and the West are bound to interact, it is argued, they will 
inevitably clash because of their apparently irreconcilable values. 
 
The atrocious attacks on the United States, on 11 September 2001, have ushered the world into a 
new era of greater uncertainty with global ramifications. It has also sparked more heated debates 
on the religious and cultural nature of ‗Islam‘ in terms of its interaction with the ‗West‘. What 
followed these attacks, including other terrorist incidents in Europe, in terms of heightening the 
feelings of suspicion, hatred and overt violence on both sides are well known and cannot be 
overstated.  
 
However, what we would like to underline at this point is that most of these debates, instead of 
engaging with specific practical issues, only added force to an already widespread assumption. 
Explained in terms of this assumption, the root causes of those events, and the background that 
made them vibrate strongly, lie in the underlying confrontation between two inherently 
irreconcilable worldviews, the Islamic and the Western. In other words, it is the long-standing 
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spaces that do not lend themselves to simple generalisations. We therefore are using these terms loosely to indicate 
what is commonly perceived as two spheres defined along certain historical, geopolitical and cultural lines. 
4
 See, for instance, Salman Rushdie (2001) ‗Yes, This is About Islam‘, The New York Times, 2 November 2001. 





clash between ‗the secular, modern Western civilisation‘ on the one hand, and the ‗religiously-
based and traditional Islamic civilisation‘, on the other. It is the clash that began with the advent 
of Islam, in the seventh century, and has been sharpened over the years by the political 
developments taking place in the Middle East and other regions. 
 
One example that illustrates this point is the uproar caused by the 12 cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad that were first published by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 
2005, and then republished in a number of European newspapers in Austria, France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain. For many Muslims, the cartoons were provocative and extremely and 
deliberately offensive given that Islam proscribes making images of its highest prophet. For 
others, they were simply an act of exercising a fundamental human right, namely the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, in a liberal, secular Western democracy. For many, the 
ensuing debate, which rapidly scaled up into aggressive rhetoric, wide scale-riots and violence, 
was only another manifestation of that ongoing confrontation between Islam and the West. 
 
Another case in point is the wearing of hijāb and its variations by Muslim women and the 
ongoing debate on whether it symbolises something voluntarily adopted by these women to 
assert their distinctiveness and their observance of Islamic decency or a symptom of culturally 
internalised norms of Muslim society. There are obviously many questions that have given rise 
to unending debates and disagreements between the two sides, but we will not discuss them here. 
Suffice it to say that there is still a long list of pending issues in the Islam-West relation, and the 
subject of human rights continues to be high on that list.  
 
A common feature of the above-mentioned debates is that they usually depart from a taken-for-
granted understanding of the Western values, whatever they are, as a set of fixed values 
contrasted with another set of specific values promoted by Islam. No nuances are admitted, and 
the two value systems are seen as two closed worlds. This is, in our view, where the problem 
lies. Our intention at this point is clearly not to discuss what the Western or Islamic values really 
are. Our main interest lies in trying to go beyond these essentialist approaches and seeking to 
open up the debate to a more flexible and critical understanding of these two social realities. 
 
As far as Islam is concerned, we think that there is a pressing need for having a holistic, dynamic 
and critical understanding of this religion as both a religious discourse and practice. This is 
because any understanding focusing solely on the Islamic holy book would lead to a historical 
and reductive reading. Likewise, an exclusive emphasis on the Islamic history, without taking 
into account the great inspiring, guiding and mobilising role of the holy book, would lead to a 
simplistic and purely materialist reading of the complexity of this religion.  
 
What is often missed in the debates, referred to above, is the emphasis on the multivocality of 
Islam—and that of the West for that matter—and the plurality and diversity of the Islamic World 
as well as its internal debates and contests regarding the definition and interpretation of the 
religious meanings and applications. What is important to underline, therefore, is that the 
deliberate or unwitting omission of the multivocal nature of this religion and its internal debates 
in any discussion on this subject can only lead to reinforcing the widespread images of Islam as a 
unitary and timeless entity untouched by internal or external developments. 
 





We have mentioned these examples not as an ‗apology‘ for Islam, but to emphasise the need for 
a dynamic and critical understanding that takes into account the complexity and inherent 
mutability of all human realities, including the Islamic ones. The lack of this understanding will 
only keep us locked in the logic of perpetual antagonisms and self-created images of the others. 
This logic has also proved so limiting to human knowledge and creativity and to the possibility 
of achieving a minimal cross-cultural understanding on vital issues such as human rights and 
their universal promotion and protection.   
 
The way forward: cross-cultural dialogue 
Taylor (1999) maintains that arriving at a genuine, unforced international consensus on human 
rights could be achieved through something like what John Rawls describes as an ‗overlapping 
consensus‘ This means that different groups and communities, while holding different or 
incompatible religious or philosophical commitments, would agree on certain norms that ought 
to govern human conduct. Taylor inquires whether this kind of consensus is possible at all. He 
responds in the affirmative, although he admits that it is not entirely clear yet around what the 
consensus would form.  
 
At the same time, Rorty (1993) takes a different approach and speaks of an efficient culture of 
human rights that is based less on the belief in a historical human nature than on the process of 
sentimental education. The problem with this conceptualisation, however, is that it provides no 
basis for a legally binding universal application of human rights or even a minimally agreed 
basis for their protection. To move beyond Rorty‘s proposition and examine the possible 
contours of the proposed overlapping consensus, we will briefly present the ideas of two Spanish 
scholars and their contributions to this ongoing debate.  
 
Cortina (1990) maintains that human rights are a set of demands—not mere aspirations—whose 
realisation and protection should be legally binding on the corresponding bodies. The reason is 
that the fulfilment of these demands and respect for these rights are the conditions of possibility 
for speaking of human beings in a meaningful way. She insists on the search for ethical criteria 
that are valid universally for enacting human rights as norms, whilst taking into account the 
varieties of moral maximums held by different cultures as long as they do not violate the 
minimal ethical criteria. Cortina refers to what she terms ‗moral pluralism‘ as indicative of the 
common values that make possible the coexistence of different communities in a single society 
despite the diversity of their own moral projects.   
 
According to Cortina, these common values would eventually represent a set of ‗minimal ethics‘ 
or ‗procedural ethics‘ (Cortina, 1990). These are nonnegotiable demands of justice recognised 
throughout society and from which we could proceed jointly to build a global consensus over 
those values. Cortina (1998) insists on the need to pursue intercultural dialogue among different 
cultures to decide on the set of values that humanise all of us without exception. In her view, the 
Kantian idea of ‗human dignity‘ as something valuable in itself, and the ethics of dialogue based 





For his part, Martínez Guzmán (2001) has proposed a planetary minimal ethics that would 
reconstruct the moral minimums shared by the different live-worlds. He presents his idea as a 





procedural proposal, that is, it indicates only the minimal moral procedure that makes the unity 
of the human reason compatible with the multiplicity of the voices in which it is expressed. It 
does not mean the imposition of a certain ethics of maximums, but the minimal recognition of 
the variety of moral maximums held by the different cultural traditions. In other words, it is a 
procedure of ethical minimums that could be filled in with the rich diversity of the different live-
worlds.  
  
From the discussion above it is clear that ensuring the universal acceptance and protection of 
human rights as an ethical and practical imperative requires an open, deliberative and 
participatory cross-cultural dialogue. However, the path of a genuine cross-cultural dialogue on 
human rights is not free from obstacles and challenges.  
 
A key issue to grapple with is the need to deal with the asymmetrical relations between, for 
instance, ‗developed‘ and ‗developing‘ countries. As Habermas (2002:212) has argued, a 
consensus based on conviction cannot come about as long as symmetry relations do not exist 
among the participations—relations of mutual recognition, reciprocal perspective-taking, a 
shared willingness to consider one‘s own tradition with the eyes of the stranger and to learn from 
one another.  
 
In addition, the historical and material legacy of colonialism should also be addressed. Some 
may regard colonialism as a phenomenon of the past, but for those who still suffer from its 
enduring consequences, the critical engagement with colonialism is still as relevant as it was 
many yeas ago. Wa Thiong‘o (1986:8) has suggested that colonialism ―involved two aspects of 
the same process: the destruction or the deliberate undervaluing of a people‘s culture, their art, 
dances, religions, history, geography, education, orature and literature, and the conscious 
elevation of the language of the colonizer‖.  
 
There is therefore a need for examining critically the colonial past and the ways in which ideas 
such as ‗civilisation‘ and ‗development‘ and the very idea of human rights have been used to 
justify colonialist practices in many parts of the world. As Habermas (2002:212) has also 
suggested ―we can criticize not only selective readings, tendentious interpretations, and narrow-
minded applications of human rights, but also that shameless instrumentalization of human rights 
that conceals particular interests behind a universalist mask – a deception that leads one to the 
false assumption that the meaning of human rights is exhausted by their misuse‖.  
 







To conclude our general discussion, we think that there are two fundamental elements that could 
be considered as a basis for engendering a constructive cross-cultural dialogue on human rights, 
which may lay the foundations for a minimal agreed understanding on the universal promotion 
and protection of human rights.  
 
The first element is the need for mutual knowledge and mutual recognition among individuals, 
groups and communities on the basis of universally agreed common values. The key term 
employed here is ‗mutual recognition‘ and not mere tolerance that may conceal behind it a sense 
of moral superiority or cultural relativism. As many commentators have pointed out, the biggest 
clash that the world may be experiencing these days is not a ‗clash of civilisations‘ but a ‗clash 
of ignorance‘. There is thus a pressing need for mutual cross-cultural learning. Yet, the 
knowledge we refer to here is not a mere strategic knowledge that may be deployed to know the 
others in order to contain and dominate them. Rather, it is a mutual knowledge that is based on 
the recognition of the others and their differences and the acknowledgement of their worth 
(Omar, 2008). 
 
However, the call for knowing and recognising the others in no way means the uncritical 
acceptance of them and their differences, because this would be tantamount to cultural 
relativism. Rather, on the one hand, it implies the acknowledgement of the existence of 
differences and submitting those differences to public debate. On the other, it means the 
recognition that differences in values and ways of life may be a source of social conflict. That is 
why it is equally important to try to identify and highlight cross-cultural commonalities that may 
serve as tools to transform those conflicts peacefully, and provide the basis for minimally agreed 
common values.  
 
The promotion and protection of universal human rights does not happen in vacuum. It takes 
place in a certain cultural context in which core human rights are culturally legitimised, 
recognised and integrated as part of the cultural fabric. Any strategies designed to promote 
human rights will therefore need to employ a new discourse that is more culturally sensitive to 
the different worldviews on the basis of a commonly agreed understanding of those rights. As 
Chris Brown argues, ―the need for a new way of talking about and promoting human dignity may 
itself be a feature of the politics of the next century‖ (Brown in Patman 2000:49). Besides, 
framed in the context of a new culturally sensitive language, universal human rights will not be 
seen as a homogenising discourse that glosses over local experiences and cultural and historical 
specificities. Rather, they will be presented as a vital issue worthy of serious consideration from 
different perspectives and cultural backgrounds within an ongoing cross-cultural dialogue.  
 
The second element is the need for an accelerated educational effort at all levels whereby people 
of different cultures and regions could know each other in the way explained above. As 
privileged places for reflection and advanced learning universities can play a vital role in this 
educative process. Moreover, all these social and political educational efforts should be guided 
by an inclusive—not an exclusive—vision of the others and the recognition of their worth, 
despite their differences, as a minimal basis for a fruitful and peaceful cross-cultural dialogue. 
 





We did not obviously want to outline any specific policies on how to implement and achieve the 
goals of this educational undertaking. It is our view that these policies are to be discussed and 
elaborated by all those who would be affected by them in an open, informed and participative 
public debate based on mutual recognition among all those involved. This fact highlights how an 
all-inclusive cross-cultural dialogue could be instrumental in providing an open forum for 
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